The economic causes and consequences of immigration are among the most important issues facing the world today. Both pro- and anti-immigration advocates are digging in their heels, and both sides look increasingly unlikely to relent.
For freedom lovers everywhere immigration is one of those complicated on confusing subjects. There are different views held within The Liberty Movement. On the one hand it is clear we cannot bring unskilled immigrants into the united states and also provide them with more welfare value (schools, services, health care, etc) than what they contribute to the society in tax revenue.
On the other hand it is also clear the free market should be perfectly capable in managing the immigrant labor market. In ideal conditions the welfare state would be minimized and the border would be more open. The invisible hand of the free market would regulate immigration far more efficiently than bearcats. In this scenario usually only those capable of adding value to the nation would immigrate. The border would still be controlled enough to screen those entering for known and wanted criminals.
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ECONOMY
Blaming immigrants for the nation's woes has long been an American pastime, especially in hard economic times like today. Recently, there has been an upsurge in anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly in areas of the country that host large number of immigrants. Public opinion surveys indicate that the public does draw a distinction between legal and undocumented immigrants, and that the public regards undocumented immigrants with increasing disfavor.
IN BRIEF
Contrary to popular belief, immigrants do not take away jobs from American workers. Instead, they create new jobs by forming new businesses, spending their incomes on American goods and services, paying taxes and raising the productivity of U.S. businesses. Immigrants are good for the economy, not the other way around.
A U.S. Department of Labor study prepared by the Bush Administration noted that the perception that immigrants take jobs away from American workers is "the most persistent fallacy about immigration in popular thought" because it is based on the mistaken assumption that there is only a fixed number of jobs in the economy.
Experts note that immigrants are blamed for unemployment because Americans can see the jobs immigrants fill but not the jobs they create through productivity, capital formation and demand for goods and services.
Immigrants pay more than $90 billion in taxes every year and receive only $5 billion in welfare. Without their contributions to the public treasury, the economy would suffer enormous losses.
Studies by the Rand Corporation, the University of Maryland, the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Research Council and the Urban Institute all show that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the earnings and employment opportunities of native-born Americans. A 1989 Department of Labor study found that neither U.S. workers in complementary jobs, nor most minority workers, appear to be adversely affected by immigration.
Much of the most controversial immigration problems are caused by authoritarian policies of the US. Un-skilled poor immigrants flooding the US is largely a result of the drug war and interventionist foreign policy.
The role of drug-related violence and extortion in promoting Mexican migration: Unexpected consequences of a drug war.
Fear has become part of our lives... There’s panic. We don’t know when the shooting is going to break out. -Tijuana citizen, quoted in Marc Lacey, “Hospitals Now a Theater in Mexico’s Drug War” Mexico’s homicide rates have increased every year since 2006 as a result of increases in territorial fights between drug cartels and changes in Mexico’s security policies (Castillo, Mej´ıa, & Restrepo, 2014; Dell, 2011; Rios, 2013). From December 2006 to 2010, 34,550 killings were officially linked to organized crime, a dramatic increase from previous years (2000-2006), when only 8,901 killings were linked to organized crime (Rios & Shirk, 2011). Most drug-related homicides concentrate at border cities, because the most profitable part of the drug-trafficking business chain occurs at US Mexico crossing points
Mexicans are not crossing into the United States to get better paid jobs or to run away from economic hardship; at least this is not the only reason. Instead, I argue that Mexicans are migrating out of fear of drug-related violence and extortion. This is particularly true in border counties, where Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have caused large increases in homicide rates and where migration to the United States entails relatively low costs. Even when we control for variables fostering migration (i.e., employment, education, and economic conditions in both countries), drug-related violence and extortion correlate with migration figures. Each one-point increase in the rate of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants correlates with 6.34 Mexicans fleeing their county of residency, and every case of extortion per 100,000 correlates with 13.03. These two forms of criminal violence account for a total of 264,692 Mexicans changing their county of residence as an unexpected consequence of Mexico’s drug war. The only way to stop the growth of migration outflows at the border is to in-crease safety within Mexican cities. A recent study measuring Ju´arez citizens’ opinion with respect to moving away for security reasons found that 55 percent of the population would leave the city if they had the opportunity to do so (Torres, 2011). It is time for policy makers to realize that migration won’t stop unless drug-related violence does first.
Comparing crime rates between undocumented immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born US citizens in Texas
Despite its centrality to public and political discourse, we lack even basic information on fundamental questions regarding undocumented immigrants and crime. This stems largely from data constraints. Going beyond existing research, we utilize data from the Texas Department of Public Safety, which checks and records the immigration status of all arrestees throughout the state. Contrary to public perception, we observe considerably lower felony arrest rates among undocumented immigrants compared to legal immigrants and native-born US citizens and find no evidence that undocumented criminality has increased in recent years. Our findings help us understand why the most aggressive immigrant removal programs have not delivered on their crime reduction promises and are unlikely to do so in the future.
Indeed, concerns over illegal immigration have arguably been the government’s chief criminal law enforcement priority for years, to the point where the federal government now spends more on immigration enforcement than all other principle criminal law enforcement agencies combined (4, 5). These policies, practices, and pronouncements, however, have far outpaced our empirical understanding of undocumented criminality. That is, while research suggests that immigrants generally tend to be less crime prone than their native peers (6), we still lack basic information on fundamental questions specific to undocumented immigrants and crime. How does the criminality of undocumented immigrants compare to legal immigrants or native-born citizens? Does this differ by the type offense, such as property, violent, or drug crimes? And how has undocumented immigrant criminality changed over time?
ADJUSTED FOR POPULATION SIZE
Felony arrest rates by detailed measures of violent and property crime, Texas (2012 to 2018).
We begin by presenting aggregate crime rates from 2012 to 2018. Fig. 1 presents violent, property, drug, and traffic arrest rates of native-born citizens, legal immigrants, and undocumented immigrants. The consistency of the comparative rates is notable. Relative to native-born citizens and legal immigrants, undocumented immigrants have the lowest felony arrest rates across all four crime types. For violent, property, and drug offenses, legal immigrants occupy a middle position between undocumented immigrants and US-born citizens. The gaps between native-born citizens and undocumented immigrants are substantial: US-born citizens are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes. These latter two findings are noteworthy. Previous research suggests that immigrants with marginal economic prospects are more heavily involved in property crime (25⇓–27), and it is plausible that drug markets may offer undocumented immigrants opportunities denied in the legitimate labor market. However, we find no evidence that undocumented immigrants are more heavily involved in property or drug offenses in Texas.
Sensitivity Analyses.
Given the legitimate concerns regarding the accuracy of the estimated size of the undocumented population, we undertake several additional sensitivity analyses. First, to ensure our findings are not dependent on idiosyncrasies in the CMS estimation technique, we replicate our results in SI Appendix, section III (SI Appendix, Figs. S13 and S14) using undocumented figures derived from the Pew Research Center. The results using this alternative data source are substantively unchanged. It bears mentioning, however, that both the Pew and CMS use variants of the residual methodology. Although independent research using multiple methods of triangulation, including death and birth records, have substantiated the general accuracy of the residual methodology (28, 29), it is not without critics.
A particular concern for our analysis would be if the Pew and CMS overestimate the size of the undocumented population because an inflated denominator would artificially decrease the observed crime rates. To examine this potential source of bias, we gauge the extent to which the undocumented population would have to be reduced to change our findings. By our calculations, in order to reach parity with US-born citizens for violent crimes, the actual undocumented population would have to be less than half (45%) the current estimate in Texas. To reach parity for property crimes, it would have to a quarter (23%) of the current estimate.
SOURCES